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15th USENIX Security Symposium

Pp. 167–178 of the Proceedings

Jason Franklin¹,Damon McCoy²,Parisa Tabriz³,Vicentiu Neagoe⁴,Jamie Van Randwyk⁵,Douglas Sicker⁶

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Abstract

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Motivated by the proliferation of wireless-enabled devices and thesuspect nature of device driver code, we develop a passivefingerprinting technique that identifies the wireless device driverrunning on an IEEE 802.11 compliant device. This technique is valuable toan attacker wishing to conduct reconnaissance against a potentialtarget so that he may launch a driver-specific exploit.
In particular, we develop a unique fingerprinting technique thataccurately and efficiently identifies the wireless driver withoutmodification to or cooperation from a wireless device. We perform anevaluation of this fingerprinting technique that shows it both quicklyand accurately fingerprints wireless device drivers in real worldwireless network conditions. Finally, we discuss ways to preventfingerprinting that will aid in improving the security of wirelesscommunication for devices that employ 802.11 networking.

1 Introduction

Device drivers are a primary source of security holes in modernoperating systems [1]. Drivers experience error ratesof three to seven times higher than other kernel code, making themthe poorest quality code in most kernels [2]. Thereare a large number of different device drivers available, each being apotentially large body of code that is frequently modified to supportnew hardware features. These factors and the fact that drivers areoften developed by programmers who lack intimate knowledge of theoperating system kernel contribute to the disproportionately highnumber of bugs found in device drivers [3].
In general, device drivers execute in kernel space; hence, exploitinga vulnerable driver leads to compromise of the entire operatingsystem. This threat is somewhat tempered by the fact that interactingwith a driver typically requires physical access to a system. As aresult, most security holes in device drivers are difficult to exploitremotely. For instance, it is hard to remotely interact with, muchless exploit, a video or keyboard driver. Classes of drivers existwith which it is possible to interact without physical access to asystem. Drivers for network devices such as wireless cards, Ethernetcards, and modems are examples. In particular, wireless network devicedrivers are easy to interact with and potentially exploit if theattacker is within transmission range of the wireless device. Today,the single most common and widespread wireless devices are thoseconforming to the IEEE 802.11 standards [4]. The vastnumber of 802.11 devices, the ease with which one may interact withtheir drivers, and the suspect nature of driver code in general hasled us to evaluate the ability of an attacker to launch adriver-specific exploit by first fingerprinting the device driver.
Fingerprinting is a process by which a device or the software it isrunning is identified by its externally observable characteristics. Inthis paper, we design, implement, and evaluate a technique forfingerprinting IEEE 802.11a/b/g wireless network drivers. Our approachis based on statistical analysis of the rate at which common 802.11data link layer frames are transmitted by a wireless device. Sincemost wireless exploits are dependent on the specific driver beingused, wireless device driver fingerprinting can aid an attacker inlaunching a driver-specific exploit against a victim whose device isrunning a vulnerable driver.
Our technique is completely passive, meaning that a fingerprinter(attacker) needs only to be able to monitor wireless traffic from thefingerprintee (target, victim). This makes it possible for anyone withintransmission range of a wireless device to fingerprint the device'swireless driver. Passive fingerprinting techniques have the advantageover active approaches in that they do not transmit data, makingprevention of such techniques difficult. If an attacker can passivelydetermine which driver a device is using, he can successfully gaininformation about his victim without fear of detection.
Our fingerprinting technique relies on the fact that most stationsactively scan for access points to connect to by periodically sendingout probe request frames. The algorithm used to scan for access pointsis not explicitly defined in the 802.11 standard. Therefore, it is upto the developers of device drivers to implement their own method forprobing. This lack of an explicit specification for a probingalgorithm in the 802.11 standard has led to the development of manywireless device drivers that perform this function entirelydifferently than other wireless device drivers. Our fingerprintingtechnique takes advantage of these implementation-dependentdifferences to accurately fingerprint a driver. Specifically, ourmethod is based on statistical analysis of the inter-frame timing oftransmitted probe requests. A timing-based approach has a number ofadvantages over a content-based approach. Primary among these is thefact that coarse-grained timing information is preserved despite theencryption of frame content as specified by security standards such asWired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) or 802.11i [5].
Fingerprinting an 802.11 networkinterface card (NIC) is not a new concept. Many tools exist, such asEthereal [6], that usethe wireless device's Media Access Control (MAC) address to identifythe card manufacturer and model number. A MAC address is anostensibly unique character string that identifies a specific physicalnetwork interface. The IEEE Standards Association assigns each NICmanufacturer a special three-byte code, referred to as anOrganizationally Unique Identifier (OUI), which identifies aparticular manufacturer. While not part of the standard, mostmanufacturers use the next byte to specify the model of the NIC. Thereare a few notable advantages to using our method instead of relying onthe information contained in the captured MAC address. First, the MACaddress only identifies the model and manufacturer of the NIC. Ourtechnique fingerprints the device driver (which resides at theoperating system level), where the bulk of exploits rest. Second,some NICs can operate using multiple drivers, implying that the MACaddress would not be enough information to identify what driver theNIC was using. Finally, whereas the MAC address is easily alterablein most operating systems, the features used by our passive techniqueare not a configurable option in any of the drivers tested.
Our testing demonstrates an accuracy for our method in identifying the driverthat ranges from 77-96%, depending on the network setting. Our techniquerequires only a few minutes worth of network data to achieve this high level ofaccuracy.We also confirm that the technique can withstand realistic network conditions.
Contributions The main contributions of this paper is the design, implementation,and eva

Jason Franklin1,Damon McCoy2,Parisa Tabriz3,Vicentiu Neagoe4,Jamie Van Randwyk5,Douglas Sicker6

Abstract

1 Introduction

Jason Franklin¹,Damon McCoy²,Parisa Tabriz³,Vicentiu Neagoe⁴,Jamie Van Randwyk⁵,Douglas Sicker⁶

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